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1The links between internationalisation, skills and wages.
The role of diﬀerences across ﬁrms and across partner countries.
Abstract
Using ﬁrm level data on Italian manufacturing industry, we examine how trade activities
are related to workforce composition and wages. We contribute to empirical research on these
issues in three ways. First, we provide novel evidence that is consistent with multi-attribute
models on ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade. In fact we show that even after controlling for various
ﬁrm characteristics, including size and capital intensity, exporters still pay higher wages and
employ more skilled workers than non exporters. Second, we consider the engagement of ﬁrms in
international transactions, either by means of exports, imports or a combination of the two. We
show that failing to control for the importing activities may bias upward export premia. Third,
we look at how the wage and the employment structures of trading ﬁrms change with the country
of destination and origin of trade ﬂows. We ﬁnd that wage and skill premia increase for both
exporters and importers as they trade with more distant markets. Richer countries are instead
associated with higher premia for importers and not for exporters.
JEL codes: F10, F16, J21
Keywords: heterogeneous ﬁrms; exports; imports; wage; skills; market heterogeneity
21 Introduction
A growing empirical and theoretical literature emphasises the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity in interna-
tional trade. This literature usually considers either productivity or the ability to produce quality
as the key exogenous determinant of ﬁrms’ diﬀerential ability to succeed in foreign markets. A few
recent contributions have started modelling heterogeneity in terms of more than a single attribute.
This is the case of Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) who propose a model with two dimensions of hetero-
geneity - productivity and caliber (i.e. the ability to produce quality using few ﬁxed inputs) - and
minimum quality requirements for entering foreign markets. Their theory predicts that, conditional
on ﬁrm size, exporters will produce higher quality and sell at higher prices. Moreover, to the extent
that production of quality goods requires more intensive use of skilled labour and capital, exporters
will pay higher wages and be more capital intensive.1
Building on these recent developments, this paper aims to shed some further light on the links
between trade, employment structure and wages. First, using data on Italy’s manufacturing ﬁrms
we shall test whether, even after controlling for various ﬁrm characteristics, including size and cap-
ital intensity, exporters still pay higher wages and employ more skilled workers than non exporters.
Consistent with multi-attribute models, we shall conﬁrm that factors other than productivity, which
might well reﬂect diﬀerences in the ability to produce quality, play a role in explaining export be-
haviour.
Second, as a partial novelty in the empirical literature, we extend the analysis beyond export
behaviour, and consider how employment composition and wages vary across ﬁrms with diﬀerent
involvement in international trade, that is ﬁrms that either export, import or do both (two way
traders). While substantial work has been done on ﬁrm heterogeneity and export, much less attention
has been devoted to the import side. Only recently the relationships between imports and ﬁrm
characteristics have attracted some consideration in empirical literature (Bernard et al., 2007; Halpern
et al., 2005; Muuls and Pisu, 2007; Kasahara and Lapham, 2008; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Castellani
et al., 2008). Even less attention has been given to ﬁrms that are engaged in a combination of
both imports and exports. This is quite surprising given the increasing importance of international
fragmentation of production, implying that more and more ﬁrms are active in both imports and
exports of intermediate and ﬁnal goods (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). We shall argue that failing to
control for imports may bias upward export premia in terms of skill composition and wages. Moreover
both types of premia are higher if the existence of two-way traders is accounted for.
Third, by exploiting the richness of our dataset which identiﬁes destination markets of exports and
markets of origin for imports, we examine how trade premia vary according to the characteristics of
the country with which a ﬁrm trades. We shall show that wage and skill premia increase as ﬁrms trade
with more distant countries, i.e. with a market characteristic that can be expected to increase the
eﬃciency and quality requirements for both import and export activities. Richer countries will be also
found to be associated with higher premia but only in the case of importers. This is consistent with
a broad interpretation of the Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) model in which high quality of imported
inputs and a skilled (and well paid) workforce are complementary in rising ﬁrm competitiveness.
The rest of this paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we brieﬂy sketch the literature
related to our study. Section 3 describes the data we use and provides some descriptive statitics.
Section 4 examines how diﬀerences in Italian ﬁrms’ involvement in international trade are associated
with diversities in their workforce structure and wages. Section 5 illustrates how the whole picture
is aﬀected by diﬀerences across ﬁrms according to the market of origin or destination of their import
and export activities. Section 6 will summarize the results and conclude.
1All models are discussed in more detail in the next section.
32 Related literature
Starting from the mid-to late 1990s empirical research has been identifying a series of stylized facts
regarding the role of ﬁrms in international trade (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Aw and Hwang, 1995;
Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Clerides et al., 1998). These studies have found that exporters are larger
and exhibit signiﬁcant productivity premia relatively to non-exporting ﬁrms (see The International
Study Group on Export and Productivity, 2008, for an international comparison).
The emerging stylized facts have led to a series of new trade models which have made important
contributions to understanding the observed intra-industry heterogeneity. One of the main features
of these models is that they consider a single exogenous attribute which determines ﬁrm’s ability to
enter foreign markets. In the standard heterogeneous trade models the single attribute is modeled
as productivity (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; Chaney, 2008). In Melitz (2003), for instance,
the existence of sunk costs induces a self-selection mechanism according to which only the most
productive ﬁrms are able to overcome these costs and enter the export market. In heterogeneous
trade models ﬁrms’ competition is based on price as more productive ﬁrms have lower marginal costs,
they can change lower prices, expand foreign sales, and earn larger revenues.
More recent empirical evidence has emphasised that exporters are not only more productive
but also more skill intensive than non-exporters and they pay higher wages (Schank et al., 2007;
Verhoogen, 2008).2 Using data from Mexico, Verhoogen (2008) shows that an increase in the incentive
to export stimulates ﬁrms to upgrade the quality of their products and, as a consequence, to maintain
higher quality workforce. Moreover, recent empirical analyses have used ﬁrm level data to study
the link between unit value prices and export behavior, concluding that exporters tend to charge
higher prices than non-exporters (Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2008; Hallak
and Sivadasan, 2009). Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), who also use data from Mexico, ﬁnd a price
premium for exporters even some years prior to the entry into foreign market, suggesting that a
process of quality upgrading takes place before exporting. Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) use data
from Colombian manufacturing plants to demonstrate that output and input prices are positively
correlated with plant size and export status. Further, Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) show that U.S.
export unit values (measured using the ten-digit Harmonenized System which classiﬁes products in
U.S. international trade) and the probability of a zero-export ﬂow increase with distance and decrease
with GDP of destination country.
These ﬁndings are clearly inconsistent with models in which diﬀerences in productivity is the key
factor underlying intra-industry heterogeneity and price competition is the basic market selection
mechanism. The latter models would in fact predict a negative correlation between unit prices and
export status. Since the productivity threshold rises with distance and decreases with destination
market size and more productive ﬁrms charge lower prices, we should also observe a negative corre-
lation between average export prices and distance and a positive correlation with destination market
size.
To rationalize these new stylized facts, a second class of models have introduced product quality
heterogeneity as key determinant of entry into export markets. Some studies attribute the diﬀer-
ences between exporters and non exporters to workers’ heterogeneity in terms of skills (Kugler and
Verhoogen, 2008). Some other models incorporate quality diﬀerentiation across ﬁrms into Melitz
(2003)’s framework so that market entry thresholds are deﬁned in terms of quality-adjusted prices,
which in turn depend on the ratio of cost to quality (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Johnson, 2007;
Kugler and Verhoogen, 2008). More productive ﬁrms produce higher quality goods which implies
higher costs, and, hence, higher prices. Since consumers care about quality goods, in these models
2Also Bernard and Jensen (1995), in their pioneering paper documented that average wages and beneﬁts (per
workers, per production worker and per non-production worker) are higher in exporting plants than in non-exporting
plants of all sizes. However, this insight has not been incorporated in trade models until recently and empirical research
on this aspect of heterogeneity has been largely underdeveloped.
4the most competitive ﬁrms are those selling high price/high quality products.3 Hence, in these mod-
els only ﬁrms with suﬃciently high-price/high quality ﬁnd it worthwhile to sell to distant and small
markets.
Both types of heterogeneous trade models, where competition is based either on diversities in
productivity or on quality diﬀerentiation, share the assumption that ﬁrms’ behaviour will vary ac-
cording to a single exogenous attribute which uniquely predicts export status and ﬁrm’s revenues.
A few recent contributions have moved away from these approaches to heterogeneity and proposed
international trade models with more than one source of ﬁrm diversity.
Perhaps the most comprehensive of these models is proposed by Hallak and Sivadasan (2009)
who introduce two dimensions of heterogeneity - productivity and caliber (i.e. the ability to produce
quality using few ﬁxed inputs) - and a minimum quality requirements for entering the export market.
Modelling heterogeneity along two dimensions allows to make additional predictions consistent with
the observed empirical facts. First, it allows to explain the empirical fact that, even conditional on
ﬁrm size, exporters sell at higher prices, pay higher wages and employ more skilled workers than non-
exporters. In fact, a given level of revenues can be the result of diﬀerent combinations of productivity
and caliber, where it is the latter that most directly aﬀects quality decisions, and hence determines
ﬁrms’ export status. 4 Second, since the export quality requirements are likely to increase with
distance and income per capita, in this model ﬁrms exporting to remote and rich countries should
exhibit high prices and quality premia.
3 Data Description and summary statistics
This paper relies upon a ﬁrm level data panel which combines two diﬀerent datasets developed by
Italy’s Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT), namely MICRO1 and COE.5
MICRO1 contains longitudinal data on a panel of 38.771 ﬁrms representing the entire universe
of Italian manufacturing companies with 20 employees and it covers the years between 1989-97.
Over the period covered by the data there are missing values partly due to the fact that some ﬁrms
may exit from the database as they either die or reduce their size and fall below the 20 employees
threshold. The existence of missing values makes MICRO1 an unbalanced panel data-set, containing
information for an average of around 20.000 ﬁrms per year. As documented by Bottazzi and Grazzi
(2007), who employ the same database, despite the unbalanced nature, the validity of the database
is largely supported by its census nature, which avoids possible biases in the data collection process,
and by the fact that there are no particular trends or changes in the structure and performance of
ﬁrms that do not appear for some years (i.e. ﬁrms that exit and re-appear again in the database).
In addition, as reported in Bartelsman and Scarpetta (2004), though manufacturing ﬁrms with less
than 20 employees account for about 88% of the total Italian ﬁrm population, ﬁrms with more than
20 employees cover almost 70% of the total employment.
Firms are classiﬁed according to their principal activity, as identiﬁed by ISTAT’s standard codes
for sectoral classiﬁcation of business (Ateco), which correspond, to a large extent, to Eurostat’s
NACE 1.1 taxonomy. The database contains information on a number of variables appearing in
a ﬁrm’s balance sheet. We utilize the following pieces of information: number of employees, type
of occupation of employees, labor costs, wages, capital, industry and geographical location (Italian
regions). Capital is proxied by tangible ﬁxed assets at historical costs. All the nominal variables are
measured in millions of 1995 Italian liras and they are deﬂated using various 2 digit industry-level price
3This is true as far as the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to quality is suﬃciently high, so that unit prices,
which depend on cost, are negatively correlated with quality-adjusted price.
4On the contrary, these empirical facts would contradict models characterized by one dimension of heterogeneity. In
these models, ﬁrms whose productivity is higher than a given threshold or producing goods beyond a given quality level
are expected to be able to sell outside national markets and hence expand their sales. This implies that the coeﬃcient
associated to the export dummy should be zero once size is controlled for.
5The databases have been made available under the mandatory condition of censorship of any individual information.
5Table 1: Number of ﬁrms










indices provided by ISTAT.6 As regards the workforce composition, separate pieces of information
are available for production workers and non-production workers.7 For the purpose of this paper we
consider the juxtaposition between these two worker categories as a proxy of the distinction between
unskilled and skilled workers, respectively.8 For each of these two groups we have access to labor
cost data, distinguishing between the wage paid to the worker (salary and severance-pay) and the
total cost paid by the ﬁrm (salary, corporate income taxation and severance-pay).
The Micro.1 database has been merged with ISTAT’s external trade register (COE), which pro-
vides ﬁrm-level information on exports and imports over the 1993-1997 period. All incoming (im-
ports) and outgoing (exports) invoices are registered in COE so it is possible to keep track of all
transactions. Note that due to the way COE is built and updated - that is by registering transactions
at the border - the link of Micro.1 and data in COE does not introduce any selection bias in the
dataset.9 The COE database supplies data on ﬁrms’ trade status and their volume of trade. More-
over, data are available on the destination of exports and the origin of imports for some geographical
areas. A table reporting all the areas for which we have detailed information is reported in Appendix
1. Table 1 presents the number of ﬁrms active in the manufacturing sector, respectively for the
original Micro.1 database and for the database obtained after the merge with the foreign dataset
(Micro.1-COE).
In Table 2 we list the variables used throughout our empirical analysis. From the MICRO1
database we obtain the following variables: number of employees, wage, wage of non-production
workers, wage of production workers, skilled labor intensity, capital intensity and foreign ownership.
The skilled labor intensity measured by the percentage of non-production workers over the total
number of employees. The capital intensity variable is deﬁned as the capital stock over the total
number of employees. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as foreign owned when the majority of its capital assets is
controlled by foreign shareholders. From the COE database, which provides information on ﬁrms’
international activities, we derive the following dummies: “non-traders”, which takes value one for
ﬁrms serving the national market only, “exporters” and “importers”, which assume value one for
6Wages are deﬂated by the consumer price index. Labor cost are deﬂated using value added index.
7Production workers include blue collars, assistants, trainees and home-based workers corresponding respectively to
the terms: operai, commessi, apprendisti and lavoratori a domicilio. Non production workers comprise managers and
clerks, corresponding respectively to the terms: dirigenti and impiegati. Unfortunately no detailed data are available
for these sub-categories included in the two main classes of production and non production workers.
8See Berman et al. (1994) for a discussion on this categorization.
9Though the 20 employees threshold does not allow us to consider the totality of ﬁrms involved in international trade
and prevent us from analyzing the behavior and the performances of smaller units, the representativeness of Micro.1
is endorsed by the fact that a large amount of the aggregate Italian trade is generated by large ﬁrms. As reported by
the Italian Statistical Oﬃce (www.coeweb.istat.it), for instance in 2005 ﬁrms with less than 20 employees accounted
for 10% of the total manufacturing export while nearly 90% of the aggregate value was generated by ﬁrms with more
than 20 employees.
6Table 2: Variables
Variable Name Abbreviation Type of variable Source Years covered
Number of employees N.Empl Continuous MICRO1 89-97
Wage Wage Continuous MICRO1 89-97
Wage non-production workers Wage NPW Continuous MICRO1 89-97
Wage production workers Wage PW Continuous MICRO1 89-97
Foreign ownership FO Dummy MICRO1 89-97
Skilled labour intensity SLI Continuous MICRO1 89-97
Capital intensity CI Continuous MICRO1 89-97
Non-traders NT Dummy COE 93-97
Importers - Dimp I Dummy COE 93-97
Exporters - Dexp E Dummy COE 93-97
Two-Way traders - Dexp∗imp T Dummy COE 93-97
Note: Monetary values (Wage, Wage NPW, Wage PW) are expressed in millions of 1995 Italian liras.
ﬁrms engaged into export or import respectively, and “two-way traders”, which is equal to one for
ﬁrms involved in both import and export activities.
Table 3 presents summary statistics on our panel, diﬀerentiating ﬁrms according to their partici-
pation into international markets. The ﬁrst column illustrates the propensity to trade in the Italian
manufacturing industry. Approximately two thirds of manufacturing ﬁrms are internationalized: on
average, over the 1993-1997 period, 67% were exporting goods, and 62% were importing. While the
distinction between exporters and importers is relevant, it is also interesting to observe that the two
sides of trade are strongly interconnected. In fact, a large fraction of importers are at the same time
also exporters (and viceversa). As a consequence, two-way traders which represent 56% of the overall
sample are by far the largest share of internationalized ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are the most engaged in in-
ternational trade activities and we may speculate that a large fraction of their import-export activity
is linked to international fragmentation of production both within and across ﬁrm boundaries.10
Consistent with other studies, we ﬁnd a remarkable heterogeneity across sub-samples of ﬁrms.
In particular, substantial diﬀerences exist between traders and non-traders in terms of size, wages,
and workforce composition. Internationalized ﬁrms are, on average, bigger, pay higher salaries for
both production and non production workers and they are more skill intensive than their domestic
counterparts. It is worth also noting that the average values for exporters are quite similar to those
reported for importers. As emerged from the participation rate, this result is mainly driven by the
fact that a large majority of importers are also exporters and vice versa. In other words, the two
groups are largely overlapping and only about 5% of all ﬁrms are engaged in either only export or
only import activities, respectively. Firms partially involved in international trade, either via import
or via export activities, rank between non internationalized ﬁrms and two-way traders in terms of
size, wage levels, skill composition (not shown, but available from the authors). Hence, there is a
strong interconnection between import and export and results in Table 3 show that a higher global
engagement of ﬁrms is associated with better performances. All together these summary statistics
reveal a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of wages and workforce composition not only between
traders and non-traders but also among ﬁrms with a diﬀerent degree of international involvement.
10Unfortunately, we have no data that allow to single out these ﬁrms from the group of two-way traders.
7Table 3: Diﬀerences between non-traders and other trading categories (average values 1993-1997)
% of ﬁrms Employ Wage Wage NPW Wage PW SLI
Non traders 27 mean 61 30.7 38.3 29.8 16.2
sd (204) (11.5) (50.2) (14.3) (16.8)
Exporter 67.3 mean 120 35.4 47.4 32.6 25.4
sd (809) (11.0) (32.5) (14.7) (17.8)
Importer 62.1 mean 122 35.7 47.9 32.8 25.8
sd (823) (11.2) (32.4) (14.9) (18.2)
Two-way traders 56.4 mean 127 35.8 48.1 32.8 26.2
sd (861) (11.0) (31.5) (15.0) (18.0)
4 Testing the links between trade and wages
The descriptive statistics in the previous section suggest that the employment and wage structure
heterogeneity among Italian manufacturing ﬁrms can be partly accounted for by considering their
diﬀerent international trade involvement. In this section we deeply investigate this source of het-
erogeneity: 1) by controlling parametrically for additional (observed and unobserved) sources of
heterogeneity; 2) by simultaneously controlling for the import and export status.
4.1 Export premia in terms of wages and skills
As recalled earlier, the literature has long analyzed the links between trade, employment and wages
almost exclusively by focusing on the role of exports. In these contributions, exporters are predicted
to be systematically diﬀerent from non exporters and export premia are traditionally expressed as
the coeﬃcient associated with an exporter status dummy. While in the single attribute models the
export dummy coeﬃcient should be zero once size is controlled for, in the multi-attribute models,
as the one suggested by Hallak and Sivadasan (2009), this is no more true. In fact exporters are
predicted to be systematically diﬀerent from non-exporters conditional on ﬁrm size. In order to test
for the existence of diﬀerences between traders and non-traders we ﬁrst estimate a simple regression
model with wages and employment structure information as dependent variables and an exporter
status dummy as independent variable. Second, following the intuition behind the multi-attribute
models we then investigate if the export premia persists after controlling for size and other ﬁrms’
characteristics. Third, exploiting the panel data structure of our dataset we employ a ﬁxed eﬀect
model which allow us to eliminate ﬁrm heterogeneity that is constant over time.
Our basic regression takes the following form
yit = αA + βAD
exp
it + θAControlsit + υit  (1)
Coeﬃcient βA captures how exporters diﬀer with respect to the baseline category of non interna-
tionalized ﬁrms. As dependent variable we consider: the average wage of all workers, the percentage
of non-production workers, the average wage of non production workers and the average wage of pro-
duction workers.11. Our set of ﬁrm level controls includes the log of the capital intensity, a dummy
indicating whether the ﬁrm is foreign owned and three-digit industries, regional and year dummies.
As a further control we include ﬁrms’ size diﬀerences.
Columns a of Table 4 reports the export premia after controlling for some ﬁrms’ characteristics
but not size. As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 4, we estimate very signiﬁcant premia in terms of
11For all these variables, except the share of non production workers, we use log values. When the percentage of non
production workers is the dependent variable, we use absolute values. Hence, the coeﬃcients for the regression with
share of non production workers as dependent variable are in percentage values while the ones for wage are scaled to
unit values.
8Table 4: Employment, wage structure and export status. Pooled OLS regressions (1993-1997)
Wage SLI Wage NPW Wage PW
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Dexp 0.071*** 0.045*** 5.878*** 5.12*** 0.057*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.161) (0.162) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Size 0.066*** 7.180*** 0.042*** 0.031***
(0.007) (0.588) (0.009) (0.007)
FO 0.180*** 0.053*** 10.482*** 1.491*** 0.177*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.045***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.574) (0.083) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
CI 0.066*** 0.091*** 1.849*** 2.620*** 0.060*** 0.108*** 0.050*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.083) (0.119) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 94772 94772 94776 94776 89019 89019 93746 93746
R-squared 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.42 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.3
Note: Dependent variables are in log values except the share of non production workers. Standard Errors in parenthesis below
the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
average wage for exporting ﬁrms which are on average 7% higher than those of non-exporters in the
same industry and location and with the same ownership structure and capital intensity. However,
as shown in Table 3, exporting ﬁrms are larger than non-exporters and this could bias upward the
exporter premia we observe in column a in Table 4. In order to control for this possible confounder
we estimate in column b equation (1) including as additional control ﬁrm’s size. In line with previous
empirical results and consistently with the predictions of multi-attribute models, our result suggests
that, even controlling for size there is a residual and positive eﬀect of exports on average wage (around
5%).
The results on average wages could be determined, inter alia, by the fact that internationalized
ﬁrms have a higher share of non production workers with respect to “domestic” ﬁrms. This suggest to
look for a possible explanation by explicitly taking into consideration diﬀerences in workforce compo-
sition at the ﬁrm level between exporters and non-exporters. As shown in Table 4, we ﬁrst test if the
proportion of the two categories of workers varies with the export status. We estimate very signiﬁcant
premia in terms of skill intensity, around 5%, even controlling for the usual sources of heterogeneity,
conﬁrming that being involved in exporting activities is associated with a diﬀerent composition of
employment in terms of white and blue collars (Verhoogen, 2008). We then separately consider the
average wage of non-production workers and the average wage of production workers as additional
dependent variables. Consistent with the empirical ﬁndings reported by Bernard and Jensen (1995),
coeﬃcients in Table 4 show that the export status has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact
on the earnings of both categories of workers. When controlling for ﬁrm size(columns b), we obtain
a wage premia of 3% and 2% for non-production and production workers, respectively.12
12The heterogeneity we observe in terms of wages, for both production and non-production workers, is not in contrast
with the centralized system of wage bargaining characterizing the labor market in Italy as well as in other European
countries. It is true that this system drives to wage equalization across ﬁrms and industries for any given level of
qualiﬁcation. However, in spite of this collective bargaining system, which is the main determinant of wages, variation
in wages across ﬁrms in the same industry can happen also through a diﬀerent positioning of workers in the rank-ladder
as emphasized in the hierarchical theories of the ﬁrm (Simon, 1957). In other words, within each worker category -
production and non-production - there is room for a large variety of tasks and occupational levels and, therefore, for
diﬀerent wage levels.
9Table 5: Employment, wage structure and export status. Fixed Eﬀect regressions (1993-1997)
Wage SLI Wage NPW Wage PW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dexp 0.010*** 0.086 0.018*** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.076) (0.004) (0.003)
Size -0.236*** -4.080*** -0.164*** -0.267***
(0.008) (0.321) (0.011) (0.010)
FO -0.009 0.055 -0.014 -0.002
(0.006) (0.255) (0.009) (0.009)
CI 0.014*** 0.044 0.008** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.075) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 94772 94776 89019 93746
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04
Number of ﬁrms 30101 30102 28060 29899
Hausman test [p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Breush-Pagan test [p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Dependent variables are in log values except the share of non production workers. Standard Errors in parenthesis below
the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
Indeed, our ﬁnding that wage premia persist after controlling for size, together with the evidence
of a higher ratio of white vs. blue collars for exporters, could reﬂect the fact that quality, rather than
or at least in addition to productivity, plays a key role in explaining exporting behavior. In fact, to
the extent that the production of quality goods requires more intense use of skilled labour and ﬁrms
serving foreign markets have to satisfy more binding quality constraints, exporters will employ more
non production workers and pay higher wages than non exporters conditional on size (Hallak and
Sivadasan, 2009).
As a third step we employ a ﬁxed eﬀect model which allows us to eliminate ﬁrm heterogeneity
that is constant in time.13 A model that takes into account ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimates a correlation
between a change in the trade status and a change of the dependent variables under analysis. Con-
trolling for ﬁxed eﬀects is likely to polish oﬀ ﬁrm speciﬁcities accounting inter alia for self selection,
hence making it possible to appreciate what remains in terms of “ex post eﬀects”. Nevertheless, we
should be careful when giving such a causal interpretation of the coeﬃcients estimated with the ﬁxed
eﬀects model. For example, it might well be that a shock at a ﬁrm level contemporaneously deter-
mines a switching into exporting and a variation in the dependent variable under analysis. Keeping
this caveat into account, we estimate equation (1) using the within transformation.
As before we employ as controls the log of the number of employees, the log of the capital intensity,
the foreign-ownership dummy and year dummies. Once we apply the ﬁxed eﬀect model (Table 5)
some of the coeﬃcients turn out to be non signiﬁcant, while others remain signiﬁcant but their values
substantially drop. Columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 5 reports the results for the ﬁxed eﬀect model for
the export premia in terms of wages, for all workers, for non-production and for production workers,
respectively. Though the magnitude is reduced the coeﬃcient remains positive and statistically
signiﬁcant meaning that exporting activities may have a positive eﬀect in terms of wage premia. The
coeﬃcient for the percentage of white collars variable (column 2) is instead insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
13We perform both the Breusch/Pagan test for the relevance of ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects to be incorporated in a panel
model and the Hausman test for the orthogonality of the individual speciﬁc eﬀects and the regressors (Table 5 and
Table 7). The Breusch/Pagan test reject the null hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity, while the Hausman test
reject the null hypothesis that the individual eﬀects are uncorrelated with the other regressors. Hence, based on these
two tests we conclude that the ﬁxed eﬀects, rather than the random eﬀects estimator, has to be implemented.
10from zero. Assuming that selection into exporting is due only to ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, this last
result could indicate that being more skill intensive than average is possibly only a precondition
for being exporters not a consequence of international activities. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that ﬁrms invest in quality and, therefore, employ more skilled workers, before entering
the export markets, as documented in the empirical work of Iacovone and Javorcik (2008).
4.2 Export and Import premia
In this section we look at the relationship between wage, employment structure and trade by simulta-
neously controlling for the import and export status. This is per se a partial novelty in the empirical
literature, as most international trade contributions normally concentrate on exports. By contrast,
we argue that on the one hand, imports may have additional implications in terms of skill require-
ments and knowledge accumulation, as compared to exports. On the other hand, ﬁrms involved in
both export and import activities (two-way traders) are even more exposed to international com-
petition than ﬁrms that either export or import, and this makes this category of ﬁrms particularly
interesting when considering employment composition and distributional patterns.
We estimate the relationship between internationalization status and ﬁrm heterogeneity in per-
formance by running the following regression




it + θBControlsit + υit (2)
where we add a dummy indicating if a ﬁrm is an importer (Dimp). As before we include a set
of controls: the log of the number of employees, the log of capital intensity, a dummy indicating
whether the ﬁrm is foreign owned and three-digit industries, regional and year dummies.
The results are presented in Table 6. In columns a we report our baseline results with only the
exporter dummy while in columns b we include the import status dummy. Looking at columns b we
observe that also importing activity is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with wages and with
the share of white collars. On average, importers pay higher wages to both non-production and
production workers and employ more skilled workers than non-importers. Although the bulk of the
theoretical models do not explicitly take into account the import behavior, one might suppose that
there may be some similarities between mechanisms underlying the choice of importing and those
explaining the choice of exporting. That is, much like exporters, importers may need to be more
productive, employ a higher number of qualiﬁed workers and pay higher wages than non-importers
because they also need to overcome some extra-cost associated to being active in foreign (import)
markets. More speciﬁcally, it has been suggested that importers need to invest in complementary as-
sets (or absorptive capacity) in order to be able to eﬀectively use imported inputs in their production
process (Castellani et al., 2008). Pushing the above argument further, it is possible that this com-
plementarity mechanism especially applies when importers purchase abroad higher quality and/or
more complex inputs compared to those domestically available. Similarly, in Kugler and Verhoogen
(2008) the complementarity between input quality and ﬁrm productivity is the key mechanism in
generating output quality. Assuming that input quality and productivity are complementary to ob-
tain higher-quality output, and that importing allows to choose among a wide variety of inputs, one
can obtain that more productive ﬁrms, that are endowed with more skilled workers, have more incen-
tives to exploit the opportunity to buy higher-quality inputs from abroad, thus they would self-select
into importing. Another explanation of this evidence relates to the information asymmetries that
importers face in the monitoring of the quality level of imported goods (Altomonte and Bekes, 2008).
Although our results do not allow discriminating between self-selection or post-entry eﬀects, they
reveal that imports play an important role in explaining ﬁrms’ heterogeneity.14
14To test the direction of causality in the relationship between trade and ﬁrm level changes in skills and wages one
should implement various econometric techniques required to control for endogeneity problems. This is beyond the
scope of our paper, though we partially tackle this issue by implementing a ﬁxed eﬀect model which will allow us to
control for time constant unobserved characteristics of ﬁrms.
11Table 6: Employment, wage structure and internationalization status. Pooled OLS regressions (1993-1997)
Wage SLI Wage NPW Wage PW
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Dexp 0.045*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 5.121*** 3.478*** 3.484*** 0.029*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.022*** 0.008** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.162) (0.172) (0.197) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Dimp 0.039*** 0.045*** 2.673*** 2.683*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.172) (0.269) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Dexp∗imp -0.010* -0.015 -0.002 -0.017***
(0.006) (0.323) (0.009) (0.006)
Size 0.066*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 7.180*** 2.504*** 2.504*** 0.042*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.588) (0.119) (0.120) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
FO 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 1.491*** 7.368*** 7.368*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.083) (0.589) (0.589) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
CI 0.091*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 2.620*** 1.401*** 1.401*** 0.108*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.119) (0.083) (0.083) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 94772 94772 94772 94776 94776 94776 89019 89019 89019 93746 93746 93746
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.30
Note: Dependent variables are in log values except the share of non production workers. Standard Errors in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***:
p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
1
2Table 7: Employment, wage structure and internationalization status. Fixed Eﬀect regressions (1993-
1997)
Wage SLI Wage NPW Wage PW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dexp 0.006** 0.086 0.012** 0.005
(0.003) (0.094) (0.006) (0.004)
Dimp 0.007** 0.035 0.009* 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.127)
Dexp∗imp 0.002 -0.020 0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.155) (0.008) (0.006)
Size -0.236*** -4.081*** -0.164*** -0.267***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.321)
FO -0.009 0.056 -0.014 -0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.255)
CI 0.014*** 0.044*** 0.0087* 0.011***
(0.002) (0.075) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 94772 94776 89019 93746
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04
Number of ﬁrms 30101 30102 28060 29899
Hausman test [p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Breush-Pagan test [p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Dependent variables are in log values except the share of non production workers. Standard Errors in parenthesis below
the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
Indeed, we observe that by including the import dummy, the coeﬃcients for exporters drop
substantially and become lower than those observed for importers. This result suggests that much of
the export premia found in the empirical literature may be driven by imports. In other words, part of
export premia observed in the data may indeed reﬂect the skill intensity of imported inputs used to
produce goods for foreign markets. Export premia can thus be expected to be biased upward if ﬁrms’
import status is not controlled for. This eﬀect is likely to be particularly relevant in the examined
case, as a large majority of exporters are also importers in our dataset (see Table 3). Moreover,
to check for a possible interdependence between importing and exporting status we include in the
regression an interaction dummy as follows






it + θCControlsit + υit  (3)
where Dexp∗imp takes value one if a ﬁrm exports and imports and zero otherwise. Hence, the
trade premia for ﬁrms involved in both export and import is given by βC +γC +φC while coeﬃcients
βC and γC respectively capture how ﬁrms that only export and only import diﬀer with respect to
the baseline category of non internationalized ﬁrms. Results are shown in columns c of Table 6. We
observe that the magnitude of the premia for two-way traders is much higher than that detected
for only exporters or only importers. Being involved both in importing and exporting is associated
with the highest premium in term of ﬁrm’s average wages, for both non-production and production
workers, followed by only importers and only exporters. This ordering conforms with what found by
Bernard et al. (2007) for the US, by Muuls and Pisu (2007) for Belgium and by Altomonte and Bekes
(2008) for Hungary. The estimated coeﬃcients for the skill intensity variable conﬁrm that two-way
traders exhibit a 6% premium, that is about twice as much as the premia observed for the one way
traders categories.
In Table 7 we will estimate equation (3) controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, which wipe out
13Table 8: Number of ﬁrms exporting to and importing from diﬀerent group of countries: average value
1993-1997
Exporters to Importers from
Panel A 90% EU HMI LI MC EU HMI LI MC
N.ﬁrms 2842 1485 398 8100 4612 1338 390 5498
Panel B 70% EU HMI LI MC EU HMI LI MC
N.ﬁrms 5341 2288 590 4605 6208 1984 665 2866
Panel C 50% EU HMI LI MC EU HMI LI MC
N.ﬁrms 7390 3461 853 1121 7352 2973 975 537
Note: EU= Trading with European countries; HMI= Trading with High Medium Income countries; LI= Trading with Low Income
countries; MC= Trading with more than one group of countries.
all the time invariant ﬁrm heterogeneity (FE model). Again, to the extent that ﬁrm speciﬁc (time
invariant) ﬁxed eﬀects are the main driver of the decision to enter international markets (i.e. of
possible self-selection phenomena), results from Table 7 may have a “more causal” interpretation of
the estimated coeﬃcients. In terms of average wages for all workers (column 1) and for white collars
(column 3) we observe that the estimated coeﬃcients remain positive and statistically signiﬁcant for
all the three categories of traders. However, in the case of blue collars the within ﬁrm change from
non-traders to traders does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on average wages. The results are
slightly diﬀerent when we consider only the export status, as before in Table 5, and when we include
also the import side. While in the previous case all employees - both non production and production
workers - take advantage of ﬁrm’s changes in production structure following the entry into foreign
markets, in this case switching the trade status leads to an increase in the wage premium paid to the
most skilled (non production) workers but not to less skilled ones.
5 Trade premia across markets
The results of the previous sections show that a fraction of the observed intra industry heterogeneity
in employment and wage structure is related to the international activities of Italian ﬁrms. We have
emphasized that excluding the import behavior, as largely done by the empirical literature insofar,
may lead to misleading results. Moreover, while the literature has mainly considered one source of
heterogeneity, either productivity or quality diﬀerentiation, our analysis is by and large consistent
with a multi-dimensional approach. In this section we move forward by assessing whether trade
premia are inﬂuenced by the characteristics of partner countries. As discussed in section 2, the
quality heterogeneous trade model (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Johnson, 2007) allows to explain
why ﬁrms that sell high priced goods abroad enter more distant and smaller markets. Similarly,
Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) predict that export quality requirements could be related to the income
per capita and distance of destination markets. In other words, we may expect that ﬁrms exporting
to rich and remote countries have higher prices and wage premia.
To investigate how ﬁrms’ characteristics hinge on heterogeneity of target foreign countries, we ﬁrst
group traders according to the type of market served. As shown in Table 8 we distinguish between
three macro geographical areas: European countries (EU); High-Medium Income countries (HMI)
including Efta, US and Canada, Other developed countries, NICs and OPECs; and Low Income
countries (LIC), consisting of ACP, CEECs, PECs and Other non developed countries. While the
majority of ﬁrms trade with more than one macro-area, there is a small number of ﬁrms exporting to
(or importing from) just one group of countries. In order to identify if a ﬁrm trades within a certain
macro area we look at how much of its total export (or import) is directed towards (or originates
14from) that area. In Panel A (upper part of Table 8), for instance, we deﬁne as EU exporters those
ﬁrms that sell to Europe more than 90% of their total exports. Similarly, HMI exporters and LI
exporters are those directing more than 90% of their foreign sales to high income and low income
countries, respectively. The category MC exporters is given by ﬁrms that trade with more than one
group of countries, i.e. those ﬁrms that export less that 90% of their total volume to one speciﬁc
macro area. Following this procedure we are able to identify four mutually exclusive dummies, one
for each macro area served by the ﬁrm. In the same way we built importers’ categories.
To check the consistency of our results we take into account diﬀerent deﬁnitions of macro-areas
using threshold shares of 70% and 50% of total export (import), as shown in Panel B and Panel C,
respectively. Obviously, the number of ﬁrms that falls in the EU, HMI and LI category increases as
the trade share decreases, while the opposite is true for the MC macro area.
We estimate the following expression









it + θControls+ υit  
where yit denotes the logarithm of average wage and the percentage of skilled workers. Es and
Is denote the dummies for exporters and importers, trading with European countries (EU), high
medium income countries (HMI), low income countries (LI) and more than one group of countries
(MC). As usual, controls is a vector including the size variable, the foreign ownership dummies, the
capital intensity indicator and sectoral, region and year dummies. Hence the βi and γi coeﬃcients
represent the percentage premia for ﬁrms exporting to and importing from the various markets, with
respect to the baseline category of non-internationalized ﬁrms.
In Table 9 we will estimate equation (4) using a Pooled OLS model. Econometric exercises were
carried out using all three panels (A, B and C). While there are diﬀerences in estimated coeﬃcients,
the hierarchy of results by country categories is substantially the same. For all the regressions we
run the F-tests for the statistical diﬀerence between ﬁrms exporting to (importing from) the three
macro areas. The p-values of the test are shown in the lower part of Table 9.
Overall Table 9 suggests that, as expected, traders’ characteristics crucially hinge on heterogeneity
of target foreign markets. Both for export and import we observe that ﬁrms trading with more than
one group of countries (MC category) appear to pay higher wages and to be more skill intensive.15
The result is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms’ performance increase with the number of countries
with which ﬁrms trade (Bernard et al., 2007; Castellani et al., 2008).
Looking closer at the export side we observe that ﬁrms selling goods to European countries pay
lower average wages and employ less skilled workers than exporters to high-medium and low income
countries. The estimated coeﬃcients for the HMI and LI countries are instead economically very
similar and, often, also statistically equivalent. These results seem to suggest that distance is one of
the main country characteristics inﬂuencing trade premia diﬀerences across exporters.
A more blurred picture emerges from the import side. As far as the wage premia are concerned
there does not seem to be much diﬀerences across ﬁrms according to the countries from which they
import. The analysis for the skill intensity variable shows instead that ﬁrms importing from low
income countries are those exhibiting the highest percentage of non-production workers.
While the previous exercise suggests us that some heterogeneity exists between ﬁrms trading with
diﬀerent markets, it does not help to understand which are the underlying sources that make trade
premia market speciﬁc. To tackle this task more directly, we explicitly take into account some country
characteristics which, as discussed in the previous sections, are likely to inﬂuence ﬁrm’s decision to
operate in one market rather than another. In particular we consider distance (DIST), gross domestic
15Similar results are obtained when using the average wage of production and non-production workers as dependent
variable. Results are not shown but are available from the authors.
15Table 9: Trade premia by country. Pooled OLS regressions (1993-1997)
Wage SLI
90% 70% 50% 90% 70% 50%
EEU 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 1.754*** 2.565*** 2.974***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.214) (0.200) (0.195)
EHMI 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 3.615*** 3.736*** 4.005***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.248) (0.226) (0.209)
ELI 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 3.727*** 4.558*** 4.851***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.419) (0.375) (0.335)
EMC 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 4.555*** 5.019*** 6.525***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.209) (0.228) (0.356)
IEU 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 1.888*** 2.405*** 2.742***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.192) (0.186) (0.184)
IHMI 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 1.801*** 2.597*** 3.182***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.255) (0.237) (0.223)
ILI 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.056*** 2.589*** 3.661*** 4.777***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.446) (0.412) (0.397)
IMC 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 4.333*** 4.694*** 4.881***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.224) (0.252) (0.470)
Observations 95231 95231 93692 95236 95236 93697
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.42
F-tests for equality between coeﬃcients
βEU = βHMI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
βEU = βLI 0.046 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
βHMI = βLI 0.452 0.561 0.186 0.805 0.039 0.013
γEU = γHMI 0.010 0.099 0.346 0.739 0.406 0.031
γEU = γLI 0.067 0.270 0.476 0.119 0.002 0.000
γHMI = γLI 0.645 0.855 0.241 0.099 0.013 0.000
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:
p<10%). All regressions include the log of employment, the log of capital intensity, as well as the foreign-ownership dummy,region
and year dummies as controls. EU= Trading with European countries; HMI= Trading with High Medium Income countries; LI=
Trading with Low Income countries; MC= Trading with more than one group of countries
product per capita (GDP) and population (POP). 16 For each of these three variables (X) we build a
ﬁrm level index, for exporters and importers. The methodology employed in computing these indexes
follows two steps.
First, we calculate, for each variable X, an indicator that aggregates country level information
into geographical areas. This is necessary because, in our dataset, we have access to information
on ﬁrm’s export and import by geographical areas (of destination or origin) rather than by single
countries (see Appendix1).17 For each geographical area g, we assign a weight to the characteristics
of each country belonging to area g according to Italy’s sectoral share of exports to country c.18 On







X ∈ {GDP DIST POP}  
16Data on GDP and population are from the Penn World Table 6.2 while data on distance are from the CEPII
database.
17This ﬁrst step is not necessary in the case of European countries for which we have information on ﬁrm’s export
and import at the level of singe countries (See Appendix 1).
18Sectoral level information at 3-digit on Italian’ export and import by country are obtained by the Italian Statistical
Oﬃce.
16where Xc is the characteristics X of country c, EXPc s is the Italian total export to country c
in sector s, while EXPs is the total export of Italy in sector s.19 We follow the same procedure to
compute the indicator on the import side (IXg s) .
The second step consists in computing the ﬁnal ﬁrm level index for each country characteristic







X ∈ {DIST GDP POP}  
Hence, we obtain a ﬁrm level index for each country characteristic (DISTe, GDPe,POPe for
export and DISTi, GDPi, POPi for import). Each index equals 0 if, in a given year, the ﬁrm does
not export or import, respectively. However, in order to give ﬂexibility to our speciﬁcation and
to take into account for a possible non linear relationship between our dependent variable and the
indexes described above, we divide the distribution of each index into quartiles, at the sectoral (two
digit) level. In this way we also account for the sectoral heterogeneity in the geographical distribution
of trade ﬂows. Therefore, we obtain for each index four quartile dummy variables
Xeqitj with j = 1 2 3 4 and X ∈ {DIST GDP POP}
where Xeqitj equals one if exporter i belongs to the jth quartile of the two-digit sectoral distri-
bution of the index Xe in year t, zero otherwise. The same holds for import (Xiqitj).
Then, we regress the (log) value of ﬁrm’s characteristics on the above described dummies that
summarize the characteristics of the geographical areas a ﬁrms trades with at time t. Among the
four dummies for each index we use as reference category the dummy representing the ﬁrst quartile
of the index distribution. We are thus enabled to test whether the average trade premia increase
or decrease as ﬁrms trade with more distant, richer or bigger countries. In our regression we also
include exporter, importer and two-way trader dummies and we control for size, capital intensity,
foreign ownership, industry, geographical location and aggregate time eﬀects.



























+ θControlsit + υit 
Table 10 and Table 11 show the results for seven diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst three columns
we consider only the export side while in the subsequent three columns we include only the import
side. We introduce progressively, from column 1 to 3 and from 4 to 6, the three dummies for each
index considered (distance, gdp per capita and population). In the last column we present the
results of the most comprehensive speciﬁcation in which we include all country characteristics and
we simultaneously control for the export and the import side.
The results for the market characteristics are qualitatively similar across the two dependent
variables, wage and skill intensity.20 We start by instigating, on the export side, the relationship
between our two dependent variables and distance (column 1 of Table 10 and Table 11). We observe
19For instance, we obtain for the characteristic GDP an indicator for the sector “Textile” and the geographical area
“Usa-Canada” which is given by Italy’s share of export to Usa in the textile industry multiplied by the Usa’GDP plus
Italy’s share of export to Canada in the textile industry multiplied by Canada’s GDP.
20Similar results are obtained when using the average wage of production and non-production workers as dependent
variable. Results are not shown but are available from the authors.
17Table 10: Wage and countries characteristics. Pooled OLS regressions (1993-1997)
Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dexp 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Dimp 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Dexp∗imp -0.012**
(0.006)
DISTeq2 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DISTeq3 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
DISTeq4 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDPeq2 -0.005 -0.007** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDPeq3 -0.005 -0.009** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)








DISTiq2 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DISTiq3 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
DISTiq4 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDPiq2 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDPiq3 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)








Observations 94772 94772 94772 94772 94772 94772 94772
R-squared 0.464 0.464 0.465 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.467
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:
p<10%). All regressions include the log of employment, the log of capital intensity, as well as the foreign-ownership dummy,region
and year dummies as controls.
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SLI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dexp 2.723*** 3.888*** 3.796*** 2.946***
(0.195) (0.267) (0.280) (0.294)
Dimp 2.493*** 2.233*** 2.219*** 0.633*
(0.195) (0.260) (0.275) (0.356)
Dexp∗imp -0.448
(0.321)
DISTeq2 2.455*** 1.918*** 1.871*** 1.514***
(0.209) (0.214) (0.216) (0.213)
DISTeq3 3.976*** 3.203*** 3.088*** 2.477***
(0.234) (0.246) (0.248) (0.245)
DISTeq4 3.791*** 3.085*** 2.919*** 2.530***
(0.240) (0.253) (0.262) (0.261)
GDPeq2 -0.024 -0.083 -0.400*
(0.217) (0.219) (0.217)
GDPeq3 -0.887*** -1.047*** -1.354***
(0.239) (0.246) (0.244)








DISTiq2 1.109*** 1.070*** 0.949*** 0.766***
(0.205) (0.209) (0.210) (0.208)
DISTiq3 3.541*** 3.505*** 3.305*** 2.884***
(0.231) (0.235) (0.236) (0.233)
DISTiq4 4.274*** 4.345*** 3.664*** 3.128***
(0.265) (0.271) (0.287) (0.285)
GDPiq2 0.534** 0.572** 0.748***
(0.228) (0.229) (0.228)
GDPiq3 0.283 0.194 0.535**
(0.246) (0.252) (0.251)








Observations 94776 94776 94776 94776 94776 94776 94776
R-squared 0.422 0.423 0.423 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.43
Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:
p<10%). All regressions include the log of employment, the log of capital intensity, as well as the foreign-ownership dummy,region
and year dummies as controls.
19that the estimated coeﬃcients for the three dummies are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant, both
for wage and skill intensity. Moreover, since the estimated coeﬃcients are higher for the dummies of
the 3th and 4th quartile, we can infer that exporting to more distant markets is associated to relatively
higher average wage and skill intensity. If we include the three dummies for GPD per capita (column
2) we observe that distance still plays a relevant role in determining both wage and skill premia.
However, in contrast with the aggregate evidence of Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) we ﬁnd a negative
correlation between wages/skill intensity and the level of development of destination markets. This
result could be explained, at least in part, with the lens of the Italian specialization patterns. Italian
ﬁrms are in fact more likely to export relatively low skill-intensive goods to developed countries (e.g.,
traditional sectors such as textile, clothing and footwear)(Di Maio and Tamagni, 2008; Onida, 1999;
DeBenedictis, 2005). A positive relationship is instead detected between wage/skill intensity and
country size (column 3). Trade premia are increasing in the size of destination markets.
Although there are not enough data to completely test the product quality theory, our results seem
to suggest that both quality and eﬃciency play a relevant role in determining export behavior. In
fact, our results suggest that export requirements, in terms of eﬃciency and/or quality, are greater
in bigger and more distant markets (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009).
According to the quality heterogeneous ﬁrms trade models (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Johnson,
2007) only ﬁrms with suﬃciently high-price/high quality ﬁnd it worthwhile to sell to distant and
small markets. Similarly, following Hallak and Sivadasan (2009)’s reasoning, since the export quality
requirements tend to increase with distance one would expect ﬁrms exporting to distant countries to
produce higher quality goods, and hence set higher prices as well. To the extent that production of
quality goods requires workers with higher ability, the skill intensity premia for ﬁrms exporting to
more distant countries could be interpreted as revealing that they produce higher quality goods than
non-exporters.
Let us now turn to investigate the results for heterogeneity across importers. Some important
regularities emerge from the data here too. As in the case of exporters, we observe that in all the
three diﬀerent speciﬁcations (from column 4 to 6), average wages and percentage of non-production
workers are positively correlated with distance. Contrary to exporters, the GDP per capita esti-
mated coeﬃcients are positive in the case of importers and, almost in all speciﬁcation, statistically
signiﬁcant. The size of the countries of origin of imports instead turned out to be not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The higher trade premia for ﬁrms importing from more distant and richer countries can be
generated by various mechanisms, ranging from diﬀerences in quality of imported products to higher
ﬁrm’s eﬃciency. Kasahara and Lapham (2008) develop a model where heterogeneous ﬁnal good
producers simultaneously decide whether to export and whether to import. Both importing and
exporting activities require paying a ﬁxed cost in any period and in any market they choose to be
active. Hence, one can argue that importing from more distant countries, given the information
asymmetries and the cultural/institutional diﬀerences, requires relatively more skilled workers in
order to deal with such legal and informational frictions (ﬁxed trade costs). In a similar vein,
ﬁrms buying from rich countries are more likely to import technologies (capital goods) or high-
quality intermediate inputs. Hence, import from these countries may require ﬁrms to invest in some
complementary assets (or absorptive capacity) in order to be able to eﬀectively use the imported
goods in their production process. From a similar perspective, if we assume that GDP per capita
of the countries of origin is a satisfactory proxy for the quality of the imported inputs, our results
are consistent with a broad interpretation of the (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2008) model in which high
quality imported inputs and a skilled workforce are complementary in rising ﬁrm competitiveness.
Overall our results seem to conﬁrm that diﬀerences among ﬁrms in terms of employment and
wage structure can be partially explained by the variety of destinations and of countries of origin
with which ﬁrms trade. The exact mechanisms underlying these results are not testable given the
data at hand. For instance, we do not have ﬁrm speciﬁc information on prices which could allow
us to separate out the quality and the eﬃciency eﬀects and to evaluate their relative importance
20across countries of origin and destination of trade ﬂows. However, our results are consistent with a
multi-attribute model in which both quality and eﬃciency levels play a key role and in which country
characteristics aﬀect the relevant thresholds of these variables, beyond which trade can take place.
6 Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the existing literature on ﬁrms heterogeneity in international trade,
highlighting several issues only marginally tackled by previous empirical studies. Our analysis yields
a set of results, some of which deserve further consideration in future research.
First, we ﬁnd that conditional on various ﬁrm characteristics, such as ﬁrm size and capital inten-
sity, exporters pay higher wages and employ more skilled workers than non-exporters. The ﬁnding of
a wage premium conditional on size together with the evidence of a higher white vs. blue collars ratio
for exporters is consistent with a model in which both dimensions of heterogeneity - productivity
and ability to produce quality - help explain diﬀerences in ﬁrm performances. Although we can not
separate out trade premia into a cost and quality eﬀect, our results suggest that trade models based
only on one source of ﬁrm heterogeneity fail to explain some trade patterns.
Second, our empirical investigation moves forward by considering the engagement of ﬁrms in
international transactions, either by means of exports, imports or a combination of the two. We ﬁnd
that also import is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with wages and with the share of white
collars. More importantly, we observe that by including imports the coeﬃcients for exporters drop
substantially and become lower than those observed for importers. This result suggests that much
of the export premia found in the data may be driven by the import side. This is particularly true
when the exports and imports are correlated within ﬁrms, as it is the case in our dataset where a
large majority of importers are also exporters and vice versa. The result we obtain in this respect
might have to do with the input composition of exported goods. To the extent that a large fraction
of imported inputs used to produce export goods are skill intensive, this will translate into upward
biased export premia if imports are not controlled for. Moreover, we observe that the magnitude of
the premia for two-way traders is much higher than that detected for only exporters or only importers.
Being involved both in importing and exporting is associated with the highest premium in terms of
ﬁrm’s wages, for both non-production and production workers, followed by only importers and only
exporters.
Third, by exploiting the richness of our dataset which identiﬁes markets of destination and origin
of trade ﬂows for each ﬁrms, we show that some further heterogeneity exists across internationalized
ﬁrms. Diﬀerences among traders in terms of employment and wage structure seem to be related also
to the type of markets served (sourced from) by these ﬁrms. Importers and exporters have a diﬀerent
sensitivity to various country characteristics. However, a common trait is that both importers and
exporters trading with more distant countries appear to be the most skill intensive and to pay highest
wages. This result is consistent with the idea put forward by recent quality trade models (single or
multi attribute) in which only ﬁrms with suﬃciently high eﬃciency and quality of production ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to sell to distant markets.
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23Appendix
Destination of export and Origin of import
List of countries (or group of countries)
Developed Countries (total)
European Countries





African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc (ACP)
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)
Other non-developed countries
Other countries
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
Planned economies countries (PECs)
Other countries
Disaggregated information on European countries
France
Belgium and Luxembourg
Netherlands
Germany
UK
Ireland
Denmark
Greece
Portugal
Spain
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